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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
In the Matter of Edwin Donald Givens, Petitioner. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000794 
ORDER 
On February 25, 2015, the Court suspended petitioner from the practice of law for 
nine (9) months with conditions, retroactively to May 14, 2014, the date of his 
interim suspension.   In the Matter of Givens, 411 S.C. 456, 769 S.E.2d 438 
(2015). Petitioner has now filed a Petition for Reinstatement pursuant to Rule 33 
of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 
of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR).     
After consideration of the entire record, including petitioner's testimony before the 
Committee on Character and Fitness, the Petition for Reinstatement is granted. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones C.J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn J. 
s/ John Cannon Few J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
May 18, 2016 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Charles Gary, Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
Hattie M. Askew, Will Outlaw, and Deboria Outlaw, 
individually and d/b/a Low Country Medical Transport; 
Low Country Medical Transport, Inc.; Eugene A. 
Kirkland; and American Medical Response, Inc. (d/b/a 
Access2Care), Defendants. 
 
Of whom American Medical Response, Inc. (d/b/a 
Access2Care) is the Appellant. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2013-002674 
Appeal From Beaufort County 

Marvin H. Dukes, III, Special Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5406 

Heard July 15, 2015 – Filed June 1, 2016 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

Robert H. Hood, Robert Holmes Hood, Jr., and H. 
Cooper Wilson, III, of Hood Law Firm, LLC, of 
Charleston; C. Mitchell Brown, Brian Patrick Crotty, and 
Michael J. Anzelmo, of Nelson Mullins Riley & 
Scarborough, LLP, of Columbia, all for Appellant. 
Joseph Dawson, III, of North Charleston, for Respondent. 
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WILLIAMS, J.:  In this civil action, American Medical Response, Inc. (AMR) 
appeals the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Charles Gary as 
to his negligence and loss of consortium claims.  AMR argues the court erred in (1) 
holding AMR could not escape liability for the negligent actions of a subcontractor 
because it owed Gary an absolute, nondelegable duty to provide safe transportation 
pursuant to its contract with the South Carolina Department of Health and Human 
Services (SCDHHS) and public policy; and (2) prematurely granting summary 
judgment in favor of Gary when AMR was not afforded a full and fair opportunity
to conduct discovery.  We reverse and remand. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On September 9, 2010, SCDHHS issued a request for proposal (RFP) regarding the 
provision of brokerage services for the South Carolina nonemergency medical 
transportation (NEMT) program.  The program was designed to provide 
nonemergency transportation services to Medicaid members who needed access to 
medical care or services. AMR responded to the RFP, and on May 25, 2011, 
SCDHHS awarded AMR a five-year contract (the Contract) to provide brokerage 
services in two of the three SCDHHS regions in South Carolina.  The parties agree 
the RFP bid documents formed the basis of the Contract under which AMR served 
as a broker for the NEMT program.1 
The Contract distinguished the broker from the transportation providers, who were 
responsible for providing the actual transportation services.  Under the Contract, 
AMR was required to recruit qualified transportation providers but could "not 
provide NEMT services or make a referral to or subcontract with a transportation 
provider" if it had "a financial relationship with the provider."  Moreover, section 
3.3.6 of the Contract provided the only time a broker could operate vehicles to 
provide transportation services was in the "very limited circumstances" set forth in 
42 C.F.R. § 440.170(a)(4)(ii)(B) (2012).2 
1 As the circuit court noted, in South Carolina, the parties do not sign a separate 
contract after the RFP process is completed. 
2 The limited circumstances outlined in subsection (B) of the regulation primarily 
involve situations in which no other qualified providers are available or able to 
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As the broker, AMR's responsibilities within the NEMT program included 
"operating a call center and contracting with transportation providers to fulfill the 
services," as well as establishing "a system that ensures high quality and 
appropriate medical transportation services are provided to South Carolina's 
Medicaid population." AMR was also "responsible for identifying, recruiting, and 
negotiating service agreements with transportation providers . . . to meet the needs 
of Medicaid members in the region."  Further, AMR was required to "immediately 
take necessary and corrective steps when representatives of SCDHHS identif[ied] 
inappropriate, undesirable, or otherwise poor service." 
The Contract also required AMR to perform several core brokerage services 
"throughout the life of the [C]ontract."  In particular, AMR was charged with 
processing transportation requests for members, verifying their eligibility for 
Medicaid, operating a call center, recruiting and maintaining an adequate 
transportation provider network, and providing administrative oversight for the 
NEMT program.  Section 3.3 set forth AMR's various operational requirements: 
3.3.5 	 Fulfillment of All Trip Requests:
3.3.5.1	  The [b]roker is responsible for fulfilling 
all verified trip requests and ensuring that 
all trips are completed safely and on-
time. SCDHHS expects the [b]roker to 
provide trip coverage twenty-four (24) 
hours a day, seven (7) days a week. 
3.3.5.2	  Fulfillment of all verified trip requests 
and ensuring that all trips are completed 
safely and on-time must include
verification of the delivery of 
transportation services through the use of 
tracking tools and cost effective methods 
to determine the real-time location of 
members, verification of member 
delivery to the medical service, vehicle 
location and disposition[,] and to aid trip 
provide the NEMT service.  See § 440.170(a)(4)(ii)(B)(1)–(4). As Gary's counsel 
conceded during oral argument, none of the exceptions are applicable here. 
16 
   
recovery processes. The functionality of 
tracking tools and methods must be 
explained operationally and approved by 
SCDHHS. 
. . . . 
3.3.7 Insurance:   
In addition to the strict quality assurance standards 
that the transportation providers must meet, the 
[b]roker must ensure transportation providers have 
insurance coverage. State law and regulations 
specify minimum insurance requirements for 
entities involved in the provision of Medicaid 
[t]ransportation [s]ervices.  The [b]roker is 
responsible for ensuring required and adequate 
coverage is obtained and maintained during term 
of contract. 
3.3.8 Accidents, Injuries, and Incidents:   
The [b]roker must promptly report to SCDHHS 
accidents, injuries, and incidents that have 
occurred in conjunction with a scheduled trip if a 
[m]ember was present in the vehicle. 
. . . . 
3.3.9  Trip Recovery: 
The [b]roker must ensure that each provider is 
responsive to all vehicle breakdowns, problems[,] 
or delays in delivering service.  The [b]roker must 
ensure that the provider has adequate backup 
vehicles to recover the trips, and ensure that 
members are not late for their appointments and 
do not spend excessive time on the vehicles. 
17 

  
 
 
 
 
3.3.10 Notification by Transportation Providers:
The [broker] must ensure that the transportation 
provider immediately informs [b]roker of any 
breakdown, accident[,] or incident as well as any 
other problems that might cause a delay of more 
than ten (10) minutes in the trip.  Immediately 
after the [b]roker is notified of a delay exceeding 
ten (10) minutes, the [b]roker must also notify 
the members or their representatives and the 
facilities or families at the destination point.  If 
necessary, other transportation should be 
arranged to ensure appropriate transport. 
Additionally, section 3.3.15 required AMR to develop a detailed monitoring plan 
and monitor the transportation providers with whom it subcontracted to confirm
they were providing quality and safe services.  If information and reports indicated 
otherwise, then subsection 3.3.15.1 required AMR to take corrective action: 
The [b]roker must have written procedures in place for 
taking appropriate corrective action whenever 
inappropriate or substandard services are furnished or 
when services that should have been furnished were not.  
In addition, the [b]roker must have written procedures for 
taking appropriate action if a transportation provider is 
out of compliance with federal or [s]tate laws or 
regulations. The [b]roker must report, not less than 
monthly, to SCDHHS on monitoring activities, 
monitoring findings, corrective action taken, and 
improvements by the transportation provider. 
Section 3.11.1 provided AMR was "responsible for receiving and responding to all 
complaints about NEMT services under this contract, whether oral or written, from
members, transportation providers, health care providers, facilities, SCDHHS[,] or 
other sources." Under subsection 3.12.1.1, the quality assurances provision, AMR 
was required to "provide assurance that transportation providers meet health and 
safety standards for vehicle maintenance, operation, and inspection; driver 
18 

  
 
                                        
qualifications and training; member problem and complaint resolution; and the 
delivery of courteous, safe, and timely transportation services." 
On January 31, 2012, Gary and his wife were passengers in an ambulance 
returning home from Gary's medical appointment.  Gary's wife had scheduled the 
trip by calling AMR, which processed her request for NEMT.  Low Country 
Medical Transport, Inc. (Low Country), a subcontractor under AMR's contract 
with SCDHHS, provided the NEMT service for Gary and his wife that day.  
Eugene Kirkland, a Low Country employee, drove the ambulance used to transport 
the couple. Prior to reaching Gary's home, the ambulance left the roadway and 
struck a tree. As a result of the accident, Gary suffered injuries and his wife died. 
Gary filed the instant lawsuit against AMR and other defendants3 (collectively 
"Defendants") on October 26, 2012, asserting claims for negligence, loss of 
consortium, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Following limited 
discovery, Gary filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims against 
Defendants. The circuit court held a hearing at which the parties filed memoranda 
on the motion.  After the court requested further briefing, AMR and Gary filed 
supplemental memoranda.  Thereafter, AMR's counsel filed an affidavit pursuant 
to Rule 56(f), SCRCP, asserting summary judgment was premature at that stage 
because the parties had not conducted material discovery.  In the affidavit, AMR's 
counsel argued AMR could not properly oppose the motion for summary judgment 
"without an opportunity to conduct written discovery and complete the necessary 
depositions," specifically noting Gary had not yet been deposed. 
The circuit court issued an order granting summary judgment in favor of Gary as to 
all claims against all Defendants.  AMR subsequently filed a motion to alter or 
amend judgment, and after a hearing on this motion, the circuit court issued a new 
order modifying its previous order.  In its new order, the court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Gary only as to the negligence and loss of consortium claims, 
and denied his motion for summary judgment as to the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claim.
3 The other named defendants were Hattie Askew, Will Outlaw, and Deboria 
Outlaw—both individually and in their capacities as owners and officers of Low 
Country—as well as Low Country and Kirkland.  Because AMR is the sole 
appellant in this case, we discuss the claims only as they relate to AMR. 
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Regarding Gary's negligence claim, the circuit court held "Defendants individually 
and collectively owed the Plaintiff a duty of care when they decided to engage in 
the business of NEMT services in South Carolina."  Relying upon sections 3.3.5 
and 3.3.15 of the Contract, the court held AMR owed Gary a duty "arising out of 
its Contract and operating as a broker of NEMT services."  Moreover, the court 
held AMR "had a contractual duty and responsibility to provide safe and reliable 
NEMT services to Medicaid members pursuant to its contract with [SCDHHS]."  
The court then concluded all Defendants "breached their duty of care to Mr. Gary 
when Low Country Medical's ambulance ran off the road." 
After finding AMR had an absolute duty to provide safe transportation, the circuit 
court held that, "[g]iven the duties imposed under the Contract and the extensive 
control [AMR] had over its NEMT service providers, [AMR] cannot walk away 
from its responsibilities under its NEMT Contract where the duties are so 
important to the Medicaid members and simply transfer it to another."  According 
to the court, SCDHHS's "Contract clearly indicates that public policy and its 
Contract impose a non-delegable duty on the NEMT [p]rogram administrators to 
provide competent and safe non-emergency medical transport services to Medicaid 
members, pursuant to a significant number of control measures and protocols." 
Finally, with respect to Gary's loss of consortium claim, the circuit court stated it 
was "clear"—based upon its earlier findings—the death of Gary's wife was caused 
by Defendants' negligence.  Therefore, the court found Gary was "entitled to 
compensatory damages against the Defendants for the loss of his wife's
companionship, aid, society, and services."  This appeal followed. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I.	 Did the circuit court err in holding AMR liable for the negligent actions of 
Low Country based upon its finding that AMR owed Gary an absolute, 
nondelegable duty to provide safe transportation pursuant to the Contract 
and public policy? 
II.	 Did the circuit court err in granting summary judgment in favor of Gary as 
to his negligence and loss of consortium claims when AMR was not 
afforded a full and fair opportunity to conduct discovery? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite the disposition of a case that does 
not require the services of a factfinder.  Dawkins v. Fields, 354 S.C. 58, 69, 580 
S.E.2d 433, 438 (2003). "Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and must not be 
granted until the opposing party has had a full and fair opportunity to complete 
discovery." Id. at 69, 580 S.E.2d at 439. "Summary judgment is not appropriate 
when further inquiry into the facts of the case is desirable to clarify the application 
of the law." Brockbank v. Best Capital Corp., 341 S.C. 372, 378, 534 S.E.2d 688, 
692 (2000). An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment by applying 
the same standard as the circuit court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP.  Woodson v. DLI 
Props., LLC, 406 S.C. 517, 528, 753 S.E.2d 428, 434 (2014).
Summary judgment is proper if, viewing the evidence 
and inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and 
affidavits, if any, show . . . no genuine issue of material 
fact [exists] and . . . the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
Id.  "Because the construction of a clear and unambiguous contract is a matter of 
law for the court, we review the [circuit] court's findings of law de novo."  Lee v. 
Univ. of S.C., 407 S.C. 512, 517, 757 S.E.2d 394, 397 (2014) (emphasis omitted). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Nondelegable Duty 
AMR contends the circuit court erred in finding AMR owed an absolute, 
nondelegable duty to provide safe transportation to Gary pursuant to both the 
Contract and public policy.4  We agree. 
4 AMR also argues the circuit court erred in concluding its alleged contractual duty 
to provide safe transportation gave rise to tort claims.  According to AMR, the 
court misconstrued the Contract's language to impose a duty that equated to strict 
liability for any and all accidents.  Although we agree the court erred in construing 
the Contract, we reject the remainder of AMR's argument.  The circuit court found 
AMR liable under the nondelegable duty doctrine, not a theory of strict liability.  
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"The general rule is that an employer is not vicariously liable for the negligent acts 
of an independent contractor." Rock Hill Tel. Co., Inc. v. Globe Commc'ns, Inc., 
363 S.C. 385, 390, 611 S.E.2d 235, 238 (2005).  "An exception to the general rule 
is that '[a] person who delegates to an independent contractor an absolute duty 
owed to another person remains liable for the negligence of the independent 
contractor just as if the independent contractor were an employee.'" Id. (alteration 
in original) (quoting Durkin v. Hansen, 313 S.C. 343, 347, 437 S.E.2d 550, 552–53 
(Ct. App. 1993)). Our supreme court has explained the exception to the rule—the 
nondelegable duty doctrine—as follows:
The term "nondelegable duty" is somewhat misleading.  
A person may delegate a duty to an independent 
contractor, but if the independent contractor breaches that 
duty by acting negligently or improperly, the delegating 
person remains liable for that breach. It actually is the 
liability, not the duty, that is not delegable.  The party 
which owes the nondelegable duty is vicariously liable 
for negligent acts of the independent contractor. 
Simmons v. Tuomey Reg'l Med. Ctr. (Simmons II), 341 S.C. 32, 42, 533 S.E.2d 
312, 317 (2000). 
As scholars have noted, "nondelegable duty does not describe direct liability in the 
sense of breach by or fault of the delegator; it is a species of vicarious liability, 
liability for the fault of another based not on the delegator's fault but on policy 
considerations." Martin C. McWilliams, Jr. & Hamilton E. Russell, III, Hospital 
Liability for Torts of Independent Contractor Physicians, 47 S.C. L. REV. 431, 453 
(1996). "The difference between direct liability and a nondelegable duty is subtle 
but important."  Simmons v. Tuomey Reg'l Med. Ctr. (Simmons I), 330 S.C. 115, 
123, 498 S.E.2d 408, 412 (Ct. App. 1998), aff'd as modified, 341 S.C. at 32, 533 
S.E.2d at 312.
Further, contrary to AMR's contentions, the Contract could potentially give rise to 
tort claims.  See, e.g., Dorrell v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 361 S.C. 312, 318, 605 
S.E.2d 12, 14 (2004) ("A tortfeasor may be liable for injury to a third party arising 
out of the tortfeasor's contractual relationship with another, despite the absence of 
privity between the tortfeasor and the third party.").  Nevertheless, our focus is 
solely on the issue of whether AMR owed an absolute, nondelegable duty to Gary. 
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The real effect of finding a duty to be nondelegable is to 
render not the duty, but the liability, not delegable; the 
person subject to a nondelegable duty is certainly free to 
delegate the duty, but will be liable to third parties for 
any negligence of the delegatee, regardless of any fault 
on the part of the delegator. 
McWilliams & Russell, supra, at 452. 
Our courts have found a nondelegable duty to exist in a limited number of cases: 
An employer has a nondelegable duty to employees to 
provide a reasonably safe work place and suitable tools, 
and remains vicariously liable for injuries caused by
unsafe activities or tools under the employer's control.  A 
landlord who undertakes repair of his property by use of 
a contractor has a nondelegable duty to see that the repair 
is done properly, and remains vicariously liable for 
injuries caused by improper repairs. 
A common carrier has a nondelegable duty to ensure that 
cargo is properly loaded and secured, and remains 
vicariously liable for injuries caused by an unsecured 
load. A bail bondsman has a nondelegable duty to 
supervise the work of his employees, and remains 
vicariously liable for injuries caused by those employees.  
A municipality has a nondelegable duty to provide safe 
streets even when maintenance is undertaken by the state 
[h]ighway [d]epartment, and remains vicariously liable 
for injuries caused by defective repairs. 
Simmons II, 341 S.C. at 42–43, 533 S.E.2d at 317–18 (footnotes omitted).  These 
"cases clearly illustrate that a person or entity entrusted with important duties in 
certain circumstances may not assign those duties to someone else and then expect 
to walk away unscathed when things go wrong."  Id. at 44, 533 S.E.2d at 318. 
In Simmons II, our supreme court added to the list of cases, holding that "a hospital 
owes a nondelegable duty to render competent service to its emergency room
patients." 341 S.C. at 50, 533 S.E.2d at 322.  The court, however, declined to 
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impose an absolute, nondelegable duty on hospitals and instead chose to adopt an 
"ostensible agency" approach, stating as follows: 
One who employs an independent contractor to perform 
services for another which are accepted in the reasonable 
belief that the services are being rendered by the 
employer or by his servants, is subject to liability for 
physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor 
in supplying such services, to the same extent as though 
the employer were supplying them himself or by his 
servants. 
Id. at 50–51, 533 S.E.2d at 322 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS:
EMPLOYERS OF CONTRACTORS § 429 (AM. LAW INST. 1965)). Although the court 
did not limit its decision to cases involving emergency room physicians, the court 
stated it was limited to "situations in which a patient seeks services at the hospital 
as an institution[] and is treated by a physician who reasonably appears to be a 
hospital employee."  Id. at 52, 533 S.E.2d at 323. 
On the other hand, in Young v. South Carolina Department of Disabilities and 
Special Needs, our supreme court held the circuit court erred in finding the
Department of Disabilities and Special Needs (DDSN) liable for torts committed
by an employee of a local board under the nondelegable duty doctrine.  374 S.C. 
360, 368, 649 S.E.2d 488, 492 (2007).  The General Assembly created the board at 
issue in Young as part of a statewide network of local boards to serve as "the 
administrative, planning, coordinating, and service delivery bod[ies] for county 
disabilities and special needs services funded in whole or in part by state 
appropriations to the [DDSN] or funded from other sources under the department's 
control." 374 S.C. at 366, 649 S.E.2d at 491 (quoting S.C. Code. Ann. § 44-20-
385 (2002)). The local board, by statute, was established as a separate entity from
DDSN, and the counties promulgated ordinances giving it authority to employ 
personnel. Id.  In granting summary judgment in favor of the estate of a disabled 
child, the circuit court held DDSN liable for torts committed by an employee of the 
local board under the nondelegable duty doctrine, finding DDSN had been 
entrusted with important duties and could not delegate those duties to the local 
board. Id. at 363, 368, 649 S.E.2d at 489, 492.  Our supreme court reversed, 
however, and found the nondelegable duty doctrine did not apply because the local 
board was "established as a separate entity with powers and duties separate from
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DDSN," and the duties exercised by the board were directly derived from the 
statutory scheme enacted by the General Assembly.  Id. at 368, 649 S.E.2d at 492. 
Likewise, in Rock Hill Telephone, our supreme court held a utility did not have an 
absolute, nondelegable duty to install an underground cable along a highway in a 
safe manner. 363 S.C. at 388, 391–92, 611 S.E.2d at 236, 238–39.  In that case, 
the utility needed to establish its initial liability for a subcontractor's negligence 
prior to seeking equitable indemnification.  Id. at 391 n.4, 611 S.E.2d at 238 n.4. 
Thus, the utility argued it had a nondelegable duty to perform the work in a safe 
manner stemming from language in a permit issued by the South Carolina 
Department of Transportation (DOT), statutory law, and regulatory law.  Id. at 391, 
611 S.E.2d at 238. In holding the provisions cited did not impose a nondelegable 
duty on the utility, the court reasoned (1) "the terms in the permit [we]re 
enforceable only as between the DOT and the utility, not the utility and a remote 
independent contractor"; and (2) "the statute and the regulation impose[d] a duty of 
reasonable care, not an absolute, nondelegable duty." Id. at 392, 611 S.E.2d at 
238–39.
Turning to the instant case, the circuit court appeared to rely heavily upon sections 
3.3.5 and 3.3.15 of the Contract—both of which reference trips being conducted 
safely—in holding AMR owed an absolute, nondelegable duty to provide safe 
transportation to Gary. Indeed, the circuit court stated Gary's claim was 
"predicated on [AMR]'s non-delegable duty to ensure all trips are completed safely 
and on time." We find the circuit court misinterpreted the nature of AMR's duties 
and responsibilities under the Contract and, as a result, erred in holding AMR 
owed an absolute, nondelegable duty to provide safe transportation to Gary.5 
5 Curiously, the circuit court used varying language in announcing the 
nondelegable duty it found AMR owed Gary. In one instance, the court found 
AMR had a nondelegable duty "to provide competent and safe non-emergency 
medical transport services to Medicaid members, pursuant to a significant number 
of control measures and protocols."  On the next page of the order, the court stated 
Gary's claim was based upon AMR's nondelegable duty "to ensure all trips are 
completed safely and on time."  Although the court used different language, each 
phrasing is consistent with its overall conclusion that AMR had an absolute, 
nondelegable duty to provide safe transportation to Gary.  Further, when asked at 
oral argument what specific duty AMR owed Gary, Gary's counsel responded that
AMR had a duty "to provide safe transportation to and from medical appointments 
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In interpreting section 3.3.5, the court overlooked an important provision 
immediately following subsection 3.3.5.1 that clarified the parties' intent regarding 
the requirement that AMR ensure "all trips are completed safely and on time."  
Specifically, subsection 3.3.5.2 provided the following:
Fulfillment of all verified trip requests and ensuring that 
all trips are completed safely and on-time must include 
verification of the delivery of transportation services 
through the use of tracking tools and cost effective 
methods to determine the real-time location of members, 
verification of member delivery to the medical service, 
vehicle location and disposition and aid to trip recovery 
processes. 
Subsections 3.3.5.1 and 3.3.5.2, when read together, demonstrate AMR's 
contractual duty was not a guarantee—on behalf of Low Country—to all eligible 
Medicaid members that each trip with Low Country would be safe and timely.  
Rather, AMR's duty was to track each trip and follow up to verify it was completed
safely and on time, and if a trip was not, then to make the appropriate arrangements 
by "aid[ing] trip recovery processes." 
A review of other provisions in the Contract further demonstrates the circuit court's 
interpretation of section 3.3.5 was inconsistent with the parties' intent.  For 
instance, section 1.2 of the Contract, titled "Intent," is rather instructive: 
Through this [RFP,] . . . [SCDHHS] will contract with up 
to three [b]rokers to administer the daily functions of the 
NEMT Program.  Specifically, the [b]roker(s)'
responsibilities will include, but are not limited to, 
operating a call center and contracting with transportation 
providers to fulfill the services. The [b]roker must 
establish a system that ensures high quality and 
appropriate medical transportation services are provided 
to South Carolina's Medicaid population.  The [b]roker 
must pay transportation providers in accordance with the 
because he is a Medicaid member seeking that service."  Thus, for consistency 
purposes, we analyze whether a nondelegable duty exists based upon this phrasing.
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terms of the written service agreement between the 
[b]roker and each transportation provider. 
Likewise, section 1.3 provided the objective of the Contract was for SCDHHS "to 
procure a qualified broker to improve the efficiency and effectiveness and to 
administer the core components of the SCDHHS's NEMT Program."  Thus, when 
read in context, subsection 3.3.5 merely set forth another administrative duty, not a 
duty amounting to AMR's guarantee of safety to all eligible Medicaid recipients of 
the NEMT program.  Although the Contract directed AMR to "establish a system 
that ensures high quality and appropriate medical transportation services are 
provided," we find the parties did not intend for section 3.3.5 to require that AMR 
serve as an insurer of passengers' safety during each Low Country trip. 
The circuit court next found AMR had a duty to ensure its transportation providers 
complied with all applicable state and federal laws and regulations, citing section 
3.3.15 of the Contract.  Section 3.3.15, in pertinent part, provides the following: 
The Offeror must include a Monitoring Plan in the initial 
proposal. The [b]roker is responsible for all services 
provided by transportation providers.  The [b]roker must 
ensure adequate oversight of transportation providers and 
ensure that they comply with all applicable [s]tate and 
[f]ederal laws and regulations.  The [b]roker must 
monitor the transportation providers to ensure 
compliance with the terms of their subcontracts and 
ensure compliance with all transportation provider-
related requirements of this RFP including driver 
requirements[;] vehicle requirements[;] complaint 
resolution[;] and delivery of courteous, safe, timely[,]
and efficient transportation services.  The monitoring 
[p]lan should address how the [b]roker will collect and 
verify the accuracy of performance data obtained from 
the NEMT providers.
While AMR did, as the circuit court noted, have a contractual duty to ensure Low 
Country complied with applicable laws and regulations, this duty was irrelevant to 
the circuit court's ultimate resolution of the issues in this case—the court made no 
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legal or factual findings as to whether AMR breached this duty.6  To the extent the 
court relied upon the second and fourth sentences in section 3.3.15 to hold AMR 
had an absolute duty to provide safe transportation, we find the court erred in 
overlooking a key portion of the provision and reading it out of context. 
Under section 3.3.15, the "delivery of courteous, safe, timely[,] and efficient 
transportation services" is expressly one of the "transportation provider-related 
requirements," not a broker requirement. The parties' intention to distinguish the 
requirements of a "broker" from that of a "transportation provider" is evidenced 
throughout the Contract. In section 1.2, for example, the parties expressly stated 
the intent of the Contract was for "the [b]roker's responsibilities [to] 
include . . . contracting with transportation providers to fulfill the services."  AMR, 
as the broker, could "only operate vehicles to provide transportation services in 
[the] very limited circumstances" outlined in 42 C.F.R. § 440.170(a)(4)(ii)(B).  
Because—as Gary's counsel conceded at oral argument—none of those limited 
circumstances were applicable, the Contract did not permit AMR to provide 
transportation services to Gary or any other Medicaid member.  Given that AMR 
could not provide transportation services itself, but rather served only as the broker 
of such services, we find it illogical to read the Contract as imposing an absolute 
duty upon AMR to provide safe transportation. 
As the broker, AMR's duty with respect to section 3.3.15 was only to monitor and 
ensure Low Country complied with the terms of its subcontract and all 
transportation provider-related requirements, as well as to "have written procedures 
in place for taking appropriate corrective action whenever inappropriate or 
substandard services [we]re furnished" by Low Country.  The parties did not intend 
to shift liability to AMR in this provision.  Although certain sentences—when read 
in isolation—may seem to imply that AMR being "responsible for all services 
provided by the transportation providers" is the equivalent of AMR being liable for 
all services provided by Low Country, we find such a narrow interpretation is 
inconsistent with the parties' intent as to this section and the Contract as a whole.  
6 The only mention of facts pertaining to this particular phrase appears in the 
second footnote of the order, in which the court briefly noted that Low Country 
experienced some administrative difficulties with the South Carolina Secretary of 
State's Office regarding its corporate status.  The circuit court, however, did not 
rule upon whether any actions by AMR or Low Country violated the law or 
otherwise had anything to do with the accident in this case. 
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The quoted sentences were all part of section 3.3.15's requirement that AMR 
include a monitoring plan in its initial proposal to address how it would "collect 
and verify the accuracy of performance data obtained by the NEMT providers" and 
report back to SCDHHS. 
In sum, nothing in the four corners of the Contract indicates the parties intended 
for AMR to serve as Low Country's insurer of absolute safety for every NEMT 
trip. Cf. Dixon v. Whitfield, 654 So. 2d 1230, 1232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) 
(finding a school board had no nondelegable duty because "[s]chool boards owe 
their pupils a duty of reasonable care in providing them with safe transportation, 
but they are not insurers of students' safety").  In fact, section 3.3.7 of the Contract 
stated AMR was responsible for ensuring transportation providers obtained and 
maintained the required and adequate insurance coverage throughout the term of 
the Contract. Cf. id. (finding although the appellants argued the school board 
"should not be allowed to avoid liability by choosing to contract for buses from
outside sources," the relevant statutes and regulations "clearly allow[ed] the 
[s]chool [b]oard to do so, provided the contractors have the necessary insurance 
coverage and the buses are properly inspected"). 
Therefore, we hold the circuit court erred by reading selected portions of sections 
3.3.5 and 3.3.15 to find the parties intended to impose upon AMR an absolute duty 
to provide safe transportation because such a narrow interpretation failed to give 
effect to the parties' intent as expressed in the Contract as a whole.  See Koon v. 
Fares, 379 S.C. 150, 155, 666 S.E.2d 230, 233 (2008) ("The purpose of the rules 
of contract construction is to ascertain the intention of the parties as gathered from 
the contents of the entire document and not from any particular provision within 
the contract."); Stanley v. Atl. Title Ins. Co., 377 S.C. 405, 414, 661 S.E.2d 62, 67 
(2008) (stating a contract is "interpreted according to the terms the parties have 
used, and the terms are to be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary, and 
popular sense"); Ecclesiastes Prod. Ministries v. Outparcel Assocs., LLC, 374 S.C. 
483, 498–99, 649 S.E.2d 494, 502 (Ct. App. 2007) ("It is fundamental that[,] in the 
construction of the language of a [contract], it is proper to read together the 
different provisions therein dealing with the same subject matter, and where 
possible, all the language used should be given a reasonable meaning." (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Brady v. Brady, 222 S.C. 242, 246, 72 S.E.2d 193, 
195 (1952))); id. at 500, 649 S.E.2d at 503 ("The court must enforce an 
unambiguous contract according to its terms, regardless of the contract's wisdom or 
folly, or the parties' failure to guard their rights carefully.").  The Contract, through 
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its numerous provisions regarding AMR's responsibilities and duties as a broker 
within the NEMT program, unambiguously imposed no such duty.
We further find the circuit court's error in interpreting the nature and extent of the 
duties and responsibilities AMR owed under the Contract controlled its analysis of 
this issue and, thus, led to the erroneous conclusion that AMR owed an absolute, 
nondelegable duty to provide safe transportation.  Cf. Young, 374 S.C. at 368, 649 
S.E.2d at 492 (noting the local board's status as a separate entity with powers and 
duties separate from DDSN in holding DDSN owed no nondelegable duty).
While it is difficult to define the exact circumstances under which a nondelegable 
duty will be found, a review of case law reveals that our courts' decisions regarding 
whether to apply the nondelegable duty doctrine are primarily grounded in public 
policy considerations. See, e.g., Simmons II, 341 S.C. at 50, 533 S.E.2d at 322 
(stating the decision to hold a hospital owes a nondelegable duty to render 
competent service to emergency room patients, like those made by other courts 
considering the issue, was grounded primarily in public policy considerations).
In its order, the circuit court stated SCDHHS's Contract "clearly indicate[d] that 
public policy and its Contract" imposed a nondelegable duty upon AMR.  The 
court, however, failed to mention any policy considerations that led it to reach this 
conclusion. Further, aside from consistently pointing to the amount of money 
AMR received under the Contract, a point which the circuit court declined to 
acknowledge as relevant to this case, Gary failed to offer any policy arguments 
below supporting the imposition of a nondelegable duty.  Specifically, Gary 
offered no legislative, judicial, or regulatory expression of public policy that would 
support a finding that AMR owed a nondelegable duty under the Contract.  We do 
not believe a mere passing reference to the general concept of public policy 
provided a sufficient basis upon which the court could find a nondelegable duty 
existed. Cf. McWilliams & Russell, supra, at 453–54 (noting "[n]ondelegable duty 
is liability without fault and[,] therefore, in our fault-based tort system, is strong 
medicine, assigned only on the basis of potent policy" (footnote omitted)). 
We find public policy does not favor finding a nondelegable duty in this case.  
First, facilitating and monitoring the nonemergency transport of Medicaid patients 
does not involve inherent danger or qualify as an abnormally dangerous activity.  
See F. PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERT L. FELIX, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF
TORTS 744–45 (4th ed. 2011) ("[One] broad area involving nondelegable duties is 
where the work involves inherent or intrinsic danger.  Similarly, a person engaged 
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in abnormally dangerous activity is responsible for injuries resulting from that 
activity even if they are caused by an independent contractor.  Vicarious liability in 
such a case is supported by the underlying policies that justify imposing strict 
liability for injuries from abnormally dangerous activities on the persons 
conducting such activities."). Second, notwithstanding Gary's argument, nothing 
in the record indicates he would not be made whole by Low Country in the event it 
was found vicariously liable for Kirkland's alleged actions.  In fact, under the 
Contract, AMR receives a fee for ensuring Low Country maintains the amount of 
insurance coverage that the General Assembly, as a matter of public policy, has 
determined is sufficient in this state. Third, finding AMR liable for any and all 
accidents would be in direct contravention of the State's objective for entering into 
the Contract—for AMR to improve efficiency and effectiveness in administering 
the NEMT program for SCDHHS—because it would unreasonably increase costs.  
Fourth, and most importantly, Gary cannot point to a statute, regulation, or 
provision of the Contract that expressly shifted liability to AMR. 
Additionally, to the extent the circuit court relied upon any control AMR had, we 
find the amount of control AMR exercised over Low Country pales in comparison 
to that which the hospital in Simmons II exercised over its emergency room
physicians. Under the Contract, SCDHHS maintained the right to direct AMR to 
fire transportation providers' drivers for substandard services or failure to comply 
with various requirements.  Thus, AMR's control was still subject to and limited by 
the ultimate control SCDHHS retained over certain functions.  While AMR 
inspected ambulances to ensure compliance with regulations, it did not furnish any 
tools or equipment to Low Country.  The parties do not dispute the fact that Low 
Country is an independent contractor.  Gary also expressly abandoned any 
argument for imposing a nondelegable duty in this case under an apparent agency 
or estoppel theory.  Therefore, although AMR did exercise some control over Low 
Country, we do not believe the level was such that we should impose a 
nondelegable duty based upon this factor alone. 
No controlling authority in South Carolina—or any other jurisdiction—supports
the proposition that AMR owed NEMT program recipients a nondelegable duty to 
provide safe transportation and could be held liable for the alleged negligence of an 
employee of its subcontractor.  See Whitfield, 654 So. 2d at 1232 (rejecting 
appellants' nondelegable duty argument and noting the parties cited no controlling 
authority, and the court could find none, to support "the proposition that the safe 
transportation of public school students is a nondelegable duty").  A plain reading 
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of the Contract demonstrates SCDHHS and AMR unambiguously did not intend to
create a nondelegable duty, and we are unable to find any substantive policy 
reasons to support imposing one in this case.7  Accordingly, we hold the circuit 
court erred in finding AMR owed Gary a nondelegable duty to provide safe 
transportation. Because the nondelegable duty doctrine was the sole basis upon 
which the circuit court found AMR liable, we reverse the grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Gary as to his negligence and loss of consortium claims.8 
II. Full and Fair Opportunity to Conduct Discovery 
In light of our resolution of the above issues, we decline to address whether the 
circuit court erred in prematurely granting summary judgment when AMR was not 
afforded a full and fair opportunity to conduct discovery.  See Futch v. McAllister 
7 Even if AMR did owe a nondelegable duty, it would not be absolute.  Given that 
a hospital's nondelegable duty to render competent services to emergency room
patients is not absolute, it would be illogical to hold a broker who arranges 
nonemergency transportation services owes an absolute duty to provide safe 
transportation to qualified recipients.  Cf. Simmons II, 341 S.C. at 50, 533 S.E.2d at 
322 (concluding it was unnecessary "to impose an absolute nondelegable duty on 
hospitals" to render competent services to emergency room patients). 
8 Unlike the concurrence, we are not prepared to say AMR owed no duty at all to 
Gary. See Simmons I, 330 S.C. at 123, 498 S.E.2d at 412 (noting "[t]he difference 
between direct liability and a nondelegable duty is subtle but important").  With a 
stated intent of creating an NEMT system "that ensures high quality and 
appropriate medical transportation services are provided to South Carolina's 
Medicaid population," SCDHHS and AMR clearly entered into the Contract for the 
benefit of eligible Medicaid recipients, a class of which Gary is a member.  See 
Dorrell, 361 S.C. at 318, 605 S.E.2d at 14 ("A tortfeasor may be liable for injury to
a third party arising out of the tortfeasor's contractual relationship with another, 
despite the absence of privity between the tortfeasor and the third party."); id. at 
318, 605 S.E.2d at 15 ("The tortfeasor's liability exists independently of the 
contract and rests upon the tortfeasor's duty to exercise due care.").  In this case, 
however, the nondelegable duty doctrine was the sole theory under which Gary 
pursued his negligence claim.  Our holding is, therefore, limited to finding AMR 
owed no absolute, nondelegable duty to provide safe transportation based upon the 
Contract or public policy. 
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Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) 
(holding an appellate court need not review remaining issues when its 
determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we REVERSE the circuit court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Gary as to his negligence and loss of consortium
claims and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
HUFF, A.C.J., concurs. 
FEW, A.J., concurring: I concur in the result reached by the majority, but not the 
analysis. I would decide this case on a narrow point—AMR had no duty of due 
care arising under the Contract or otherwise regarding the manner in which Low 
Country or its employees drove the ambulance.  Because AMR had no duty of due 
care in the first place, I do not believe it is necessary to discuss nondelegable duty. 
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One Belle Hall Property Owners Association, Inc. and 
Brandy Ramey, individually, and on behalf of all others 
similarly situated, Respondents, 
 
v. 
 
Trammell Crow Residential Company; TCR NC 
Construction I, LP; Belle Hall Direct 101, LP; TCR RLD 
Condominiums, Inc.; CS 101 Belle Hall, LP; TCR 
Southeast, Inc.; TCR Carolina Properties, Inc.; TCR SE 
Construction, Inc.; TCR SE Construction II, Inc.; TCR 
Construction, a division of Trammell Crow Residential; 
TCR Development, a division of Trammell Crow 
Residential; Trammell Crow Residential Carolina, a 
division of Trammell Crow Residential; and Tauer 
Consulting Company, Inc., a division of Trammell Crow 
Residential, each individually and collectively d/b/a 
"Trammell Crow Residential," "Trammell Crow" or 
"TCR"; Halter Properties, LLC; Halter Realty, LLC; and 
Halter Realty Group, LLC, each individually, and 
collectively d/b/a/ "Halter Companies"; Jane Doe 1-5; 
ABG Caulking & Waterproofing of Morristown, Inc. 
a/k/a ABG Caulking Contractors; Advanced Building 
Products & Services, LLC; BASF Corporation; Budget 
Mechanical Plumbing, Inc.; Builders First Source-
Southeast Group, LLC; Builders Services Group, Inc., 
individually, and d/b/a Gale Contractor Services, Inc.; 
Century Fire Protection, LLC; Cline Design Association, 
P.A. and Gary D. Cline; Coastal Lumber & Framing, 
LLC; Dodson Brothers Exterminating Co., Inc. a/k/a 
Dodson Pest Control; First Exteriors, LLC; Flooring 
Services, Inc.; General Heating & Air Conditioning 
Company of Greenville, Inc. d/b/a General Heating and 
Air; Jimmy Warner, individually, and d/b/a Warner 
34 

 Heating & Air; Glazing Consultants, Inc.; GWC Roofing, 
Inc., individually, and d/b/a Southcoast Exteriors, Inc.; 
Houston Stafford Electrical Contractors, LP a/k/a IES 
Residential, Inc. d/b/a Houston Stafford Electric; KMAC 
of the Carolinas, Inc.; P&P Metal Sales Co., Inc. a/k/a 
P&P Metal Sales, LLC a/k/a P&P Metal Sales, Inc. a/k/a 
Carolina Metals; Pleasant Places, Inc.; Raymond 
Building Supply Corporation d/b/a Energy Saving 
Products of Florida, Inc. a/k/a Energy Saving Products of 
Florida; RS Custom Homes, LLC; Southern Specialties, 
Inc.; Structural Contractors South, Inc.; Superior 
Construction Services, Inc., individually, and d/b/a 
Superior Masonry Unlimited, Inc.; TAMKO Building 
Products, Inc. f/k/a TAMKO Roofing Products, Inc.; 
VNS Corporation, individually, and d/b/a Wholesale 
Building Products f/k/a Wholesale Building Materials, 
Inc.; What Don't We Do; and John Doe 1-25, 
Defendants, 
 
Of whom TAMKO Building Products, Inc., is the 
Appellant. 
 
VNS Corp., individually, and d/b/a Wholesale Building 
Products f/k/a Wholesale Building Materials, Inc., Third-
Party Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
Billy Grady d/b/a United Builders, LLC, Third-Party 
Defendant, 
 
Houston Stafford Electrical Contractors, LP a/k/a IES 
Residential, Inc. d/b/a Houston Stafford Electric, Third-
Party Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
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J. Correa Electrical Company, LLC, Third-Party 
Defendant. 
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REVERSED 
Richard Hood Willis, Paula Miles Burlison, and Angela 
Gilbert Strickland, all of Bowman & Brooke, LLP, of 
Columbia, for Appellant. 
Justin O'Toole Lucey and Dabny Lynn, both of Justin 
O'Toole Lucey, P.A., of Mount Pleasant, for 
Respondents. 
WILLIAMS, J.:  In this civil matter, Tamko Building Products, Inc. (Tamko) 
appeals the circuit court's denial of its motion to dismiss One Belle Hall Property 
Owners Association, Inc. (the Association) and Brandy Ramey's (collectively 
"Respondents") claims and compel them to arbitration.  Tamko argues the court 
erred in finding the arbitration clause located in its limited warranty was 
unconscionable and unenforceable.  We reverse. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This appeal arises from a dispute over the construction of One Belle Hall (OBH), 
an upscale condominium community in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina.  The 
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Association is responsible for the management and administration of the OBH 
community as well as the investigation, maintenance, and repair of its common 
elements. Headquartered in Joplin, Missouri, Tamko manufactures and sells 
residential and commercial roof shingles nationally and internationally. 
During the construction of OBH, and prior to the transfer of ownership from its 
developers to the Association, a roofing subcontractor installed Tamko's "Elite 
Glass-Seal AR" asphalt shingles to the roofs of the condominium community's four 
buildings. Tamko covered the installed shingles with a twenty-five-year "repair or 
replace" limited warranty (Warranty) against manufacturing defects.  At issue in 
this case is the Warranty's inclusion of a binding arbitration clause that provided 
the following: 
MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION: EVERY 
CLAIM, CONTROVERSY, OR DISPUTE OF ANY 
KIND WHATSOEVER INCLUDING WHETHER ANY 
PARTICULAR MATTER IS SUBJECT TO 
ARBITRATION (EACH AN "ACTION") BETWEEN 
YOU AND TAMKO (INCLUDING ANY OF 
TAMKO'S EMPLOYEES AND AGENTS) RELATING 
TO OR ARISING OUT OF THE SHINGLES OR THIS 
LIMITED WARRANTY SHALL BE RESOLVED BY 
FINAL AND BINDING ARBITRATION, 
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE ACTION 
SOUNDS IN WARRANTY, CONTRACT, STATUTE 
OR ANY OTHER LEGAL OR EQUITABLE THEORY. 
TO ARBITRATE AN ACTION AGAINST TAMKO, 
YOU MUST INITIATE THE ARBITRATION IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE RULES 
OF ARBITRATION OF THE AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (WHICH ARE 
AVAILABLE ONLINE AT www.adr.org OR BY 
CALLING THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION 
ASSOCIATION AT 1-800-778-7879) AND PROVIDE 
WRITTEN NOTICE TO TAMKO BY CERTIFIED 
MAIL AT P.O. BOX 1404, JOPLIN, MISSOURI 64802 
WITHIN THE TIME PERIOD PRESCRIBED 
IMMEDIATELY BELOW. 
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Beneath this clause, Tamko included a separate section, titled "Legal Remedies," in 
which it purportedly excluded all express and implied warranties and disclaimed its 
liability for all incidental and consequential damages.  Additionally, the section 
stated that any dispute relating to the shingles or the limited warranty must be 
commenced within one year after the accrual of such cause of action or one year 
after purchase, depending upon whether the jurisdiction prohibited the exclusion of 
warranties or statutory claims.  The section, however, provided that, if any of these 
limitations were inconsistent with or unenforceable under any applicable state law, 
then such terms did not apply.  In a subsequent paragraph, the Warranty prohibited 
class arbitration as well as class action litigation. 
At some point following OBH's completion, Respondents assert the community's
buildings were affected by moisture damage, water intrusion, and termite damage, 
all resulting from various alleged construction deficiencies.  In February 2010, a 
developer of OBH contacted Tamko to report a warranty claim on the roof 
shingles, contending they were blistering and defective. As part of its standard 
warranty procedure, Tamko sent the developer a "warranty kit," requiring the 
claimant to provide proof of purchase, samples of the allegedly defective shingles, 
and photographs. The developer failed to return the warranty kit within 120 days 
and, therefore, Tamko inactivated the warranty plan.   
On November 19, 2012, Respondents filed a proposed class action lawsuit on 
behalf of all owners of condominium units at OBH, alleging defective construction 
against the community's various developers.  Respondents amended their 
complaint on December 30, 2013, to bring, inter alia, causes of action for 
negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability against numerous contractors 
and commercial entities, including Tamko for its allegedly defective roof shingles.  
Tamko filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration on February 28, 2014, 
arguing Respondents were bound by the arbitration clause provided in the 
Warranty for its roof shingles. Respondents filed a memorandum in opposition to 
Tamko's motion, contending neither the Association nor the property owners ever 
agreed to arbitrate, and the arbitration clause was unconscionable and 
unenforceable. 
After holding a hearing on the matter, the circuit court denied Tamko's motion to 
compel arbitration on September 17, 2014.  In its order, the court ruled that South 
Carolina law invalidated several of the Warranty's provisions, including the 
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arbitration clause. Specifically, the court noted that the sale of Tamko's shingles 
was based upon an adhesion contract, and Respondents lacked any meaningful 
choice in negotiating warranty and arbitration terms.  Relying heavily upon two 
prior cases addressing the subject,1 the court held the arbitration clause was 
unconscionable and unenforceable due to the cumulative effect of several 
oppressive and one-sided terms in the Warranty.  Lastly, the court found it could 
not uphold the arbitration clause because it was not severable from the Warranty's 
unlawful terms.  This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The question of the arbitrability of a claim is an issue for judicial determination, 
unless the parties provide otherwise." Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 
580, 596, 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2001).  This court reviews an arbitrability 
determination de novo.  Hall v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 413 S.C. 267, 271, 776 
S.E.2d 91, 94 (Ct. App. 2015). "Nevertheless, a circuit court's factual findings will 
not be reversed on appeal if any evidence reasonably supports the findings."  
Simpson, 373 S.C. at 22, 644 S.E.2d at 667. 
LAW/ANALYSIS  
Tamko argues the circuit court erred in finding the arbitration clause located in the 
Warranty was unconscionable and unenforceable.  We agree. 
"The policy of the United States and South Carolina is to favor arbitration of 
disputes." Zabinski, 346 S.C. at 596, 553 S.E.2d at 118.  Unless the parties have 
contracted otherwise, the Federal Arbitration Act2 (FAA) applies in federal or state 
court to any arbitration agreement involving interstate commerce.3 Munoz v. 
1 See Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 373 S.C. 14, 644 S.E.2d 663 (2007); 
Smith v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 403 S.C. 10, 742 S.E.2d 37 (Ct. App. 2013), cert. 
granted, (July 24, 2014). 
2 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). 
3 Tamko is headquartered in Joplin, Missouri, and has several manufacturing 
facilities across the country, none of which are located in South Carolina. 
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Green Tree Fin. Corp., 343 S.C. 531, 538, 542 S.E.2d 360, 363 (2001).  The FAA 
provides that a written arbitration provision in a contract involving interstate 
commerce "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
"Under the FAA, an arbitration clause is separable from the contract in which it is 
embedded and the issue of its validity is distinct from the substantive validity of 
the contract as a whole." Munoz, 343 S.C. at 540, 542 S.E.2d at 364 (citing Prima 
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 411 (1967)). 
"General contract principles of state law apply to arbitration clauses governed by 
the FAA." Id. at 539, 542 S.E.2d at 364. Thus, courts may invalidate arbitration 
agreements on general state law "contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, and 
unconscionability." Zabinski, 346 S.C. at 593, 553 S.E.2d at 116. 
"In South Carolina, unconscionability is defined as the absence of meaningful 
choice on the part of one party due to one-sided contract provisions, together with 
terms that are so oppressive that no reasonable person would make them and no 
fair and honest person would accept them." Simpson, 373 S.C. at 24–25, 644 
S.E.2d at 668. "In analyzing claims of unconscionability of arbitration agreements, 
the [U.S. Court of Appeals for the] Fourth Circuit has instructed courts to focus 
generally on whether the arbitration clause is geared towards achieving an 
unbiased decision by a neutral decision-maker." Id. at 25, 644 S.E.2d at 668 
(citing Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999)).  
In Simpson, our supreme court held an arbitration clause in a vehicle trade-in 
contract between an automobile dealership and customer was unconscionable and 
unenforceable. 373 S.C. at 34, 644 S.E.2d at 674.  In upholding the denial of the 
dealer's motion to compel arbitration, the court first found the customer had no 
meaningful choice in agreeing to arbitrate.  Id. at 25–28, 644 S.E.2d at 699–70.  
The court noted the trade-in agreement was an adhesion, or "take-it-or-leave-it," 
contract that it viewed with "considerable skepticism" because automobiles are 
necessities in modern society.  Id. at 26–27, 644 S.E.2d at 669–70. According to
the court, the customer lacked business judgment to fully understand the 
ramifications of agreeing to arbitrate, had no attorney present to assist her, and was 
Therefore, because the subject shingles were sold in interstate commerce, the 
circuit court properly determined the FAA applies in this matter. 
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"hastily" presented with the contract by the dealer for her signature.  Id. at 27, 644 
S.E.2d at 670. 
Further, the Simpson court found the arbitration clause's limitation on statutory 
remedies was oppressive and one-sided. Id. at 28–30, 644 S.E.2d at 670–71.  The 
court pointed out that the clause prohibited an arbitrator from awarding statutorily 
required double and treble damages for violations of the South Carolina Unfair 
Trade Practices Act4 and the South Carolina Regulation of Manufacturers, 
Distributors, and Dealers Act.5 Id. at 28–29, 644 S.E.2d at 670–71. Specifically, 
the court explained the provision was unconscionable because its unconditional 
requirement that the customer waive statutory remedies ran contrary to the statutes' 
very purpose in punishing acts that adversely affect the public interest.  Id. at 30, 
644 S.E.2d at 671. The court also found a provision in the arbitration clause that 
allowed the dealer's judicial remedies to supersede the customer's arbitral remedies 
was unconscionable because it failed to promote a neutral and unbiased arbitral 
forum. Id. at 30–32, 644 S.E.2d at 671–72. While the provision forced the 
customer to submit all of her claims to arbitration, it preserved the dealer's right to 
bring judicial proceedings against the customer for various causes of action that 
would not be stayed pending the outcome of arbitration.  Id. at 30, 644 S.E.2d at 
672. 
Based upon the cumulative effect of the foregoing oppressive and one-sided 
provisions contained within the entire clause, the Simpson court held the arbitration 
clause was unconscionable and unenforceable.  Id. at 34, 644 S.E.2d at 674. 
Lastly, the court ruled it could not sever the offensive provisions to save the 
arbitration clause because only a disintegrated fragment of the agreement would 
remain.  Id. at 34–35, 644 S.E.2d at 673–74. Notwithstanding its finding that the 
dealer's arbitration clause was unconscionable, the court stressed "the importance 
of a case-by-case analysis . . . to address the unique circumstances inherent in the 
various types of consumer transactions." Id. at 36, 644 S.E.2d at 674. 
Following Simpson, this court later held an arbitration clause embedded in a home
sales contract was unconscionable and unenforceable.  D.R. Horton, 403 S.C. at 
4 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 39-5-10 through -560 (1985 & Supp. 2015).  
5 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 56-15-10 through -600 (2006 & Supp. 2015).  
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14–15, 742 S.E.2d at 40–41. In D.R. Horton, the buyers purchased a house from a 
corporate homebuilder, which included an arbitration clause in its warranty.  Id. at 
12, 742 S.E.2d at 39.  Under a provision outside the section addressing arbitration, 
the homebuilder retained the right to terminate the agreement if a dispute arose 
prior to closing, but the buyers would have no right to sue on the contract.  Id. 
Likewise, the homebuilder disclaimed liability to the buyers in another section for 
"monetary damages of any kind, including secondary, consequential, punitive, 
general, special[,] or indirect damages."  Id. at 13, 742 S.E.2d at 39. 
In upholding the circuit court's denial of the homebuilder's motion to compel 
arbitration, this court held the arbitration clause was unconscionable, particularly 
in light of the provision exempting the homebuilder from all monetary damages.  
Id. at 15, 742 S.E.2d at 40–41. Furthermore, the court found it should not sever the 
arbitration clause from the unconscionable provisions located in other sections of 
the purchase agreement, again highlighting the homebuilder's attempt to waive its 
liability for the purchasers' damages. Id. at 16–17, 742 S.E.2d at 41. 
During the same year D.R. Horton was decided, however, this court also found an 
arbitration clause in another home sales agreement was not unconscionable.  See 
Carlson v. S.C. State Plastering, LLC, 404 S.C. 250, 258–60, 743 S.E.2d 868, 873– 
74 (Ct. App. 2013). In Carlson, the home purchasers argued the arbitration clause 
was unconscionable based upon Simpson because the sales contract contained 
various one-sided limitations, including one that purported to shorten the 
applicable statute of limitations to two years.  404 S.C. at 259–60, 743 S.E.2d at 
873–74. This court disagreed, finding the provisions were not located within the 
arbitration clause and, thus, irrelevant for purposes of determining whether the 
clause was unconscionable.  Id. at 260, 743 S.E.2d at 874. Moreover, the court 
found the arbitration clause was clearly identified in the sales agreement, did not 
lack mutuality because it applied to both the seller and purchasers, and did not 
force the purchasers to waive any legal rights.  Id. at 260, 743 S.E.2d at 873–74.
Turning to the instant case, we hold the circuit court erred in finding the arbitration 
clause in the Warranty was unconscionable.  First, we find the circuit court erred in 
concluding the adhesive nature of the Warranty contributed to the 
unconscionability of the arbitration clause. See Simpson, 373 S.C. at 36, 644 
S.E.2d at 674 (recognizing "the importance of a case-by-case analysis . . . to 
address the unique circumstances inherent in the various types of consumer 
transactions"). Our supreme court has made clear that adhesion contracts are not 
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per se unconscionable.  See id. at 27, 644 S.E.2d at 669. In this case, the 
underlying sale of Tamko's shingles was a typical modern transaction for goods in 
which the buyer never has direct contact with the manufacturer to negotiate prices 
or warranty terms.  A manufacturer offers a standard warranty to the marketplace 
and gives buyers the choice of accepting it by keeping the goods or rejecting it by 
returning the goods for a refund.  See generally S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-204(1) 
(2003) ("A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to 
show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence 
of such a contract."); S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-606(1)(b) (2003) (providing a buyer 
accepts the goods if he fails to make an effective rejection following a reasonable 
opportunity to inspect them).  Indeed, the Tamko shingles' packaging contained a 
section titled "Important: Read Carefully Before Opening," providing that, "if [the 
purchaser] is not satisfied with the terms and conditions of [the Warranty], [then he 
must] return all unopened marketable products to the original place of purchase for 
a refund."
Second, we find the arbitration clause facilitates an unbiased decision by a neutral 
decisionmaker in the event of a dispute. See Simpson, 373 S.C. at 25, 644 S.E.2d 
at 668 (stating courts should generally focus on whether an arbitration clause is 
"geared towards achieving an unbiased decision by a neutral decision-maker").  
Pursuant to the arbitration clause, the purchaser must submit "every claim, 
controversy, or dispute of any kind whatsoever" relating to Tamko's shingles or the 
Warranty to arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association. The arbitration clause does not unduly limit a purchaser's right to a 
meaningful legal proceeding. In fact, the clause even anticipates actions from 
purchasers that "sound[] in warranty, contract, statute[,] or any other legal or 
equitable theory." Therefore, we find the arbitration clause is not oppressive or 
one-sided.6 See Carlson, 404 S.C. at 260, 743 S.E.2d at 873–74. 
Finally, we hold the circuit court erred in finding the arbitration clause was not 
separable from the Warranty.  See Munoz, 343 S.C. at 540, 542 S.E.2d at 364 
6 Although the arbitration clause may appear one-sided because only the consumer 
is required to submit claims to arbitration, Tamko contends it would never be 
forced to initiate a cause of action—such as a collection dispute—against an end 
user because it receives payment for its products upon delivery to its various 
distributers.  
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(providing that, under the FAA, "an arbitration clause is separable from the 
contract in which it is embedded and the issue of its validity is distinct from the 
substantive validity of the contract as a whole").  While the circuit court cited 
Simpson for the proposition that it could not sever the arbitration clause from the 
Warranty's purportedly unlawful terms, our supreme court in that case directly 
focused upon whether it could sever unconscionable provisions that were within 
the arbitration clause. 373 S.C. at 34, 644 S.E.2d at 674 (finding the arbitration 
clause unconscionable due to the "cumulative effect of a number of oppressive and 
one-sided provisions contained within the entire clause").  In the instant case, 
Tamko's section on legal remedies is separate and distinct from the Warranty's
arbitration clause.7  Accordingly, following the reasoning of Munoz and Carlson, 
we hold that the Warranty's limitations and disclaimers are irrelevant to our 
analysis concerning the unconscionability of the arbitration clause because they are 
not part of the clause. See Munoz, 343 S.C. at 540, 542 S.E.2d at 364 (holding the 
issue of the validity of an arbitration clause is distinct from the validity of the 
contract as a whole); Carlson, 404 S.C. at 260, 743 S.E.2d at 874 (holding 
purportedly unlawful terms that were not part of the arbitration clause were 
irrelevant for purposes of determining whether the clause itself was 
unconscionable). But see D.R. Horton, 403 S.C. at 16–17, 742 S.E.2d at 41 
7 We disagree with Respondents' contention that the legal remedies section is a part 
of the arbitration clause. However, even if the section was a continuation of the 
arbitration clause, it is prefaced with the phrase "[e]xcept where prohibited by law" 
and provides that "some states do not allow exclusion or limitation of implied 
warranties or incidental or consequential damages, so the above limitations or 
exclusions may not apply."  Therefore, even considering the terms Respondents 
find objectionable, we are unable to conclude the arbitration clause is 
unconscionable because these terms would not apply in the underlying dispute if 
the arbitrator found they violated South Carolina law.  In any event, we believe
South Carolina's Commercial Code generally permits sellers of goods to include 
most of the limitations and exclusions found in the Warranty.  See S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 36-2-316(2)-(3) (2003) (allowing a seller to exclude or modify implied 
warranties); S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-719(1)(a) (2003) (permitting a seller to repair 
or replace nonconforming goods in lieu of statutory remedies); § 36-2-719(3) 
(allowing a seller to exclude consequential damages); see also York v. Dodgeland 
of Columbia, Inc., 406 S.C. 67, 91–94, 749 S.E.2d 139, 151–53 (Ct. App. 2013) 
(upholding a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement under the FAA).   
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(refusing to sever an arbitration clause from unconscionable provisions located in 
other parts of the contract). 
In conclusion, we hold the circuit court erred in finding the cumulative effect of the 
Warranty's purportedly unlawful terms rendered the arbitration clause 
unconscionable and unenforceable. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the circuit court's order is 
REVERSED. 

HUFF, A.C.J., and LOCKEMY, J., concur.  
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